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CRIMINAL LAW-The Use of Transferred Intent in
Attempted Murder, a Specific Intent Crime:
State v. Gillette
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Gillette,' a case of first impression in New Mexico, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for attempted murder
where the specific intent to kill was directed at someone other than the
actual victim.2 The Gillette court applied the common law doctrine of
transferred intent,3 rather than requiring specific intent, and upheld the
sufficiency of transferred intent to convict Gillette of attempted murder.4
This Note discusses the court's rationale in light of the nature of attempt
liability and the underlying principles of transferred intent.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 29, 1983, an anonymous person left a package at Kathleen's 5
1. State v. Gillette, 102 N.M. 695, 699 P.2d 626 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
2. Id. at 705, 699 P.2d at 636; Justice Donnelly delivered the opinion of the Court, to which
Justice Hendley dissented. Id. at 697, 706, 699 P.2d at 628, 637.
3. See infra Section III for discussion of transferred intent.
4. Gillette, 102 N.M. at 705, 699 P.2d at 636.
5. Id. at 698, 699 P.2d at 629, n. 1. On the court's own motion Kathleen and her family were
referred to by first name only. The charges against Gillette arose out of a bizarre and tangled scenario.
Id. Gillette met Kathleen and her family in California in August of 1980. Id. He became a boarder
in their home. Id. Kathleen was living with her three children, including D.M., age 12. Id. D.M.
testified that Gillette shared a room with him and made sexual advances to him. Id. D.M. also
testified that he initially resisted these advances, but later submitted to Gillette. Id. In August 1981,
Kathleen moved her family to Albuquerque. Id. Gillette moved with the family and continued to
live in their home. Id. D.M. testified that he and Gillette continued their sexual activity after the
move to New Mexico until April 1982. Id.
Kathleen discovered that Gillette had sexually propositioned her older son, and asked Gillette to
move out of her home. Id. Gillette left, but was allowed to visit D.M. until Kathleen decided that
Gillette and D.M. were spending too much time together. Id. Kathleen forbade Gillette from seeing
D.M. Id. Gillette, however, would secretly come to visit D.M. approximately once per week and
spend the night with D.M. Id. Sexual activity would occur between Gillette and D.M. during these
visits. Id.
In the latter part of November 1982, a fire occurred in the attic of Kathleen's house. Id. The
evening of the fire, Gillette and D.M. discussed the family's possible move to Australia, due to
Kathleen's recent engagement and plans to move the family there. Id. Later that night D.M. was
awakened and his mother told him that someone had started a fire in the house. Id. Gillette had left
sometime earlier. Id. Arson investigators found evidence of arson in the garage. Id. at 699, 699
P.2d at 630. A witness identified Gillette as having purchased a container of the same brand of fuel
as was found in Kathleen's home. Id. Gillette was charged with burglary arising from his unlawful
entry of Kathleen's home and arson resulting from the fire in the attic. Id.
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workplace containing a can of poisoned Dr. Pepper.6 Kathleen, suspicious
of its flavor,7 asked two co-workers, Erdmann and Westbrook, to taste
the Dr. Pepper.8
Gillette was later arrested and tried in Bernalillo County District Court
for the attempted murder of Kathleen, Erdmann, and Westbrook.9 The
district court applied the doctrine of transferred intent and convicted
Gillette of attempted first degree murder on all counts. 0 The court de-
termined that because Gillette left a poisoned drink for Kathleen intending
to kill her, his intent to kill was transferred to others who ingested the
poison." The court concluded that Gillette's intent followed the container
of poison and, therefore, he was guilty of attempted murder of each
individual who drank from the container.' 2
Gillette appealed the convictions for the attempted murder of Erdmann
and Westbrook. ' He argued that attempted murder is a specific intent
crime"' and that there was no evidence to show that he had the specific
intent necessary to support a conviction of attempted murder of Erdmann
or Westbrook. ' The state argued that Gillette's convictions should be
upheld based on the doctrine of transferred intent.' 6 Under the state's
theory, Gillette's intent to murder Kathleen by deliberation and premedi-
tation transferred to Erdmann and Westbrook when they drank from the
poisoned Dr. Pepper."' The New Mexico Court of Appeals agreed with
the state's theory, upholding the convictions on the ground that Gillette's
intention to murder Kathleen transferred to the foreseeable victims of his
act. "
6. Id. Kathleen testified that several months after the fire, when she arrived at work at Presbyterian
Hospital, a package containing a Dr. Pepper had been left for her by an anonymous person. Id.
7. When Kathleen tasted the Dr. Pepper, she thought it tasted terrible. Id.
8. Id. Erdmann and Westbrook also drank from the container and thought something had been
added to the Dr. Pepper. Id. They noticed that the bottom of the container had been tampered with
and resealed. Id. The police were notified. Id.
Chemical tests established that pentobarbital had been mixed with the beverage. Id. Pentobarbital
can cause death if taken in sufficient quantities. Id. It is commonly used for death by injection. Id.
At the time the pentobarbital was discovered in the Dr. Pepper, Gillette was employed at an animal
clinic, where he had access to sodium pentobarbital. Id. Sodium pentobarbital turns into pentobarbital
if mixed with Dr. Pepper. Id. Evidence showed that Gillette had worked as a paramedic and was
experienced in administering injections. Id.
9. Id. at 695, 699 P.2d at 626.
10. Id. at 699, 699 P.2d at 630; there is no "attempted first degree murder" statute. The com-
bination of the attempt to commit a felony statute and the murder statute form the basis of the charge
of attempted first degree murder. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-28-1 and 30-2-1 (1978).
11. Gillette. 102 N.M. at 695, 699 P.2d at 626.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra note 23, for an example of a specific intent crime.
15. Id. at 703, 699 P.2d at 634.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 705, 699 P.2d at 636.
18. Id.
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Ill. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
To effectively analyze the Gillette court's reasoning, it is necessary to
first address the nature of attempt liability, and the underlying principles
of transferred intent. This Note will then discuss the New Mexico Court
of Appeals' application of these principles to Gillette.
A. Attempt Liability
A charge of criminal attempt has two elements: a specific intent to
commit a particular crime, and an act done in furtherance thereof but
which fails to effect its commission. ," There can be no conviction for
criminal attempt without proof of a specific intent to effect the particular
criminal consequence which constitutes the completed crime.2" Thus,
commission of an act that creates a probability of death or great bodily
harm does not necessarily allow the inference that the actor had the intent
to kill. If the crime of attempt could be accomplished by an act alone
without a specific intent, then the law would convict an individual for
intending to do an unintended act, a logical impossibility. 2'
Central to an understanding of attempt liability is an understanding of
intent. It is, therefore, important at this juncture to address the two types
of intent, specific and general. Specific and general intent are difficult
terms to apply due primarily to the inherent ambiguity of the definition
of specific intent and general intent. Often the characterization of a par-
ticular crime as one of specific intent is made by the presence of words
in the statutory language describing psychological factors, such as intent
or malice.22 When a statute refers to the defendant's intent to do some
19. People v. Neal, 97 Cal. App. 2d 668, 671, 218 P.2d 556, 559 (1950); See also 40 C.J.S.
Attempts §68 (1944). N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-28-1 (1978), provides in part that an "[a]ttempt to
commit a felony consists of an overt act in furtherance of and with intent to commit a felony and
tending but failing to effect its commission." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-28-1 (1978).
20. Note, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 841-42 (1928); Specific intent required to
constitute the crime will not be imputed or inferred. State v. Thomas, 127 La. 576, 53 So. 868
(1910); Jones v. State, 159 Ark. 215, 251 S.W. 690 (1923); State v. Martin, 119 S.W.2d 298 (Miss.
1938).
21. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 310 Pa. Super. 39, 456 A.2d 171 (1983). In those instances where
the notion of transferred intent is an accepted doctrine of liability, the argument has been made that
the use of transferred intent in the criminal law be limited to those cases where the unintended victim
was severely harmed or injured. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. LAW. REV. 650, 656. See also
People v. Williams, 102 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 162 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1980) (transferred intent has no
applicability to cases where the victim is not injured).
Analytically, reliance upon harm to determine culpability makes little sense. It does, however,
suggest a general dissatisfaction with the use of transferred intent. The courts find it necessary to
seize upon the element of harm in order to justify the use of transferred intent. This suggests that
if transferred intent is to be used in attempt cases, it should be used only in those instances where
the unintended victim suffered harm. Gillette is not such a case.
22. N.M. Unif. Jury Instruction-Criminal 1.50, Add. 1, Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Criminal Intent
in New Mexico (1978).
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act beyond the prohibited actus reus, the crime is deemed to be one of
specific intent.23 When the definition of a crime consists of only the
description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further
act or achieve a particular consequence beyond the prohibited actus reus,
the intent involved is deemed to be a general criminal intent.24
B. Underlying Principles of Transferred Intent
Transferred intent has the effect of blurring the distinction between
specific intent and general intent. It is the common law doctrine which
states that one's criminal intent follows the corresponding criminal act
to its unintended consequences.25 If the defendant intends a particular
consequence, he is guilty of a crime of intention as to that consequence
even though his act takes effect upon someone other than the desired
victim.6 A legal fiction transfers intent from the person planned to be
injured to another.27 The defendant is then treated as though he had
intended to harm the actual victim when, in fact, he did not have any
such purpose as to that person, but was only reckless.28 Attempt is a
crime that can only be committed intentionally.29 Therefore, it requires
intention as to a given consequence, not merely recklessness.3°
23. Id. Attempt, for example, is considered to be a specific intent crime, for within the language
defining the crime is contained the phrase "with intent." See supra note 19, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-28-1.
24. N.M. Uniform Jury Instruction-Criminal 1.50, Add. 1, Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Criminal
Intent in New Mexico, (1978). For example, aggravated assault, is a general intent crime; the actor
need only intend to cause bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon. See N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-3-2 (1978).
25. People v. Mathews, 91 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1979). See generally W.
LAFAVE & A. SCorr, BASIC PREMISES OF CRIMINAL LAW, §§ 34-35, at 243 (1972).
26. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, §46, at 126 (1961).
27. Id.
28. Id. For example, if D fires a gun at a duck and hits P, his act in regard to P is considered
reckless. However, if he is shooting at another human being, 0, his act in regard to P is regarded
as intentional. Id. at § 48, at 134. Actually D is reckless in each case. However, the application of
the transferred intent doctrine requires that in the second case, there is attempted murder of 0. Id.
D has the mens rea of murder (of 0), and commits the actus reus of murder (of P); the difference
in victim is immaterial. Id. This reasoning results in a collapse of the distinction between intentional
behavior and reckless behavior. With intentional behavior, the consequence is desired. Id. § 24, at
53. With reckless behavior, the consequence is foreseen as possible or probable, but not desired.
Id. Gillette is such a case. Gillette's single act toward Kathleen was intentional. The consequence
of that act as to Erdmann and Westbrook was not intentional, but reckless.
29. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, § 22, at 51 (1961).
30. Id. A single act may be intentional as to one consequence and reckless as to a second. Id.
§ 24, at 57. For example, a person who drives at an excessive speed through a school zone just
when school is letting out, realizing that there is great danger of hitting a child, intentionally commits
the offense of speeding. "If, however, he kills someone, the death will be caused recklessly, not
intentionally, for the death, unlike the mode of driving, is not intentional." Id. § 24, at 58. In Gillette,
Gillette's single act toward Kathleen was intentional. The consequence as to Erdmann and Westbrook
was reckless.
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C. The Court's Rationale
In Gillette, the defendant intended to kill and in fact, attempted a
killing.3 Although the result as to Kathleen was intended, the result as
to Erdmann and Westbrook was not.32 Gillette was not convicted for
attempting to kill in the abstract; he was convicted for the attempted
murder of Erdmann and Westbrook.33 It should, therefore, be necessary
to establish specific intent in relation to the attempted murder of Erdmann
and Westbrook. Gillette may have been guilty of attempted murder, but
not of an attempt to murder Erdmann and Westbrook."
In support of its use of transferred intent in sustaining the attempted
murder convictions, the Gillette court looked to cases where courts applied
transferred intent to uphold convictions for the murder of unintended
victims.35 In those cases, murder convictions were upheld even though
the specific intent to kill was directed at someone other than the actual
victim.36 The Gillette court analogized that an attempted murder convic-
tion may be upheld on the same grounds,37 and reasoned that where one
intends to assault or kill a certain person, and by mistake or inadvertence
assaults or kills another in his stead, the intent is transferred from the
party who was intended to the actual victim.38 The court stressed the
significance of the fact that danger to Erdmann and Westbrook was real
31. Gillette, 102 N.M. at 703, 699 P.2d at 634.
32. Id. The opinion states that no specific intent to murder Erdmann and Westbrook was shown.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 706, 699 P.2d at 637.
35. Id. at 703, 699 P.2d at 634. See State v. Hamilton, 89 N.M. 746, 557 P.2d 1095 (1976)(upheld two murder convictions for death of intended as well as unintended victim); State v. Carpio,
27 N.M. 265, 199 P. 1012 (1921) (shooting); Coston v. State, 144 Fla. 676, 198 So. 467 (1940)
(poisoning).
36. State v. Hamilton, 89 N.M. 746, 557 P.2d 1095 (1976); State v. Carpio, 27 N.M. 265, 199
P. 1012 (1921); Coston v. State, 144 Fla. 676, 198 So. 467 (1940).
37. Gillette, 102 N.M. at 704, 699 P.2d at 635. The court offered no policy reasons for concurring
with the cases cited in note 35 supra.
38. Id. The Gillette court cited People v. Wells, 145 Cal. 138, 140, 78 P. 470, 471 (1904) in
support of the use of transferred intent. In Wells, the court determined that transferred intent may
be applied where one intends to assault or kill a certain person and by mistake kills or assaults
another in his stead. Id. Literally speaking, however, the "mistaken identity" situation is not a case
of transferred intent, because the target which the defendant actually aimed at is the victim. See
People v. Williams, 102 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 162 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1980); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
BASIC PREMISES OF CRIMINAL LAW, § 87, at 252-55 (1972). For example, if A shoots at B and harms
or kills B, believing him to be C, A has the specific intent to shoot at B. His mistake as to B's
identity does not negate the specific intent to shoot at B. There is no need to transfer any intent;
the intent was clearly there. The Wells court, therefore, unnecessarily applied the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent. If one accepts this analysis, then the Gillette court's reliance on Wells was misplaced.
A true transferred intent situation would be presented where A shoots at B with the intent to harm
B. A misses B and hits C, an innocent bystander. Here it is clear that A did not have the intent to
harm C, but was merely reckless toward C. The latter example appears to be the situation in Gillette,
supporting a charge of recklessness rather than one of attempted murder.
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and was proof of Gillette's present ability to kill.39 The court determined
that it was of no consequence that none of the victims were harmed, since
the gravamen of the offense of attempted murder is the felonious intent
manifested in an attempt to poison." The court concluded that since
Gillette left a poisoned drink for Kathleen intending to kill her, his fe-
lonious intent to kill transferred to others who foreseeably ingested the
poison.41
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The implications of applying transferred intent to attempted murder, a
specific intent crime, are substantial.42 Gillette's conviction allows an
attempt conviction of an individual without proof of specific intent, which
is contrary to the very requirement of proof of specific intent in attempt
crimes. If Gillette had the specific intent to murder Erdmann and West-
brook, the court would not have found it necessary to apply the doctrine
of transferred intent. The court's use of transferred intent was an admis-
sion of the absence of Gillette's specific intent to kill Erdmann and
Westbrook.
Whereas a finding of specific intent is necessary for a conviction of
39. No law requires, however, that proof of the ability to kill is necessary to proving a specific
intent to kill. There is no language in either § 30-28-1 or § 30-2-1 that speaks of ability to kill. N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30-28-1 and 30-2-1 (1978). Gillette's ability to kill could just as easily be proof of
his recklessness toward Erdmann and Westbrook. However reckless Gillette's conduct may have
been, without proof of a specific intent to commit the crime for which he was convicted, there
should be no liability for criminal attempt. See Gillette, 102 N.M. at 706, 699 P.2d at 637 (Hendley,
J., dissenting).
40. Gillette, 102 N.M. at 705, 699 P.2d at 636. See also State v. Ready, 110 S.C. 177, 96 S.E.
287 (1918) (the court held that the gravamen of the offense of attempted murder is the felonious
intent manifested in an attempt to poison).
41. Gillette, 102 N.M. at 705, 699 P.2d at 636. Justice Hendley, in dissent, disagreed with the
majority's application of transferred intent. He stated that a charge of attempt to murder will not
support a conviction where the evidence shows that the injury to the unintended victim was accidental.
Id. at 706, 699 P.2d at 637 (Hendley, J., dissenting). There was no evidence that Gillette was even
aware of the existence of Westbrook and Erdmann. Therefore, the convictions should be reversed.
Id. Hendley viewed the majority's decision as extending the doctrine of transferred intent beyond
reasonable grounds. Id. Justice Hendley focused on the requirement of specific intent in an attempt
crime rather than following the majority's analogy to murder. Id. He stated that if, without justifi-
cation, one fires a shot at another with the intent to kill, and unexpectedly inflicts a non-fatal injury
upon an unintended victim, he is guilty of an attempt to commit murder-but the attempt was to
murder the person he was in fact trying to kill and not the person who was hit accidentally. Id.
According to Justice Hendley, so far as the criminal law is concerned, there is no transfer of this
intent from one to the other in order to support a conviction of an attempt to murder the unintended
victim. Id.
42. The Gillette decision creates ambiguity in similar cases by disregarding the intent of the actor
where exactness in requiring specific intent to be proven is mandated. This decision undermines a
basic premise of American jurisprudence, consistency in applying the law. Gillette also permits the
court to rewrite the law, an area reserved for the legislature, by ignoring the fundamental requirement
of specific intent. The use of transferred intent in attempt crimes where no specific intent is proven
as to the actual victim does not provide sufficient latitude for charges of lesser offenses.
[Vol. 17
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attempted murder, a3 however reckless Gillette's conduct was, without a
specific intent to murder Erdmann and Westbrook, he should not have
been convicted for attempted murder. Conviction should not rest upon a
presumption that if the actor intended to kill one person, he also intended
to kill all others who were within the circle of danger. This expands
liability for attempt where there is no foreseeability of the victims and
where the defendant has no specific intent to kill. There is no evidence
that Gillette was even aware of the existence of Erdmann and Westbrook."
He could not, therefore, have had the specific intent to kill them.
The Gillette decision reduces the state's burden of proof in attempt
crimes. After Gillette, the state need only show a general criminal intent,
rather than the previously required showing of specific intent, in order
to get an attempt conviction. This shifts the burden of proof from the
state to the defendant, who now bears a greater burden in proving his
innocence.
V. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Gillette applied the
common law doctrine of transferred intent to uphold a conviction of
attempted first degree murder, even though the specific intent to kill was
directed at someone other than the actual victims.45 The result of this
decision in New Mexico criminal law is to negate proof of the actor's
specific intent in criminal attempt, a specific intent crime. The Gillette
decision expands liability for attempt where there is no foreseeability of
the victims and where the defendant has no specific intent to kill. A
defendant in New Mexico charged with an attempt crime now has a greater
burden to bear, while the state has a lesser burden of proving only a
general criminal intent, rather than specific intent.
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43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 28 and 29.
44. Gillette, 102 N.M. at 706, 699 P.2d at 637 (Hendley, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 705, 699 P.2d at 636.
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